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Development economists have been incurious
about the origins of their subject; little has been
published on this topic (Arndt 1972) and it is
perhaps usual to suppose that the subject began
with the political reordering of the world that
followed the second world war (Simpson 1976).
This article looks at the period from about 1935
to 1945, when fairly evident harbingers can be
discerned in reports of international agencies,
writings of students of international economic
relations, and policies and pronouncements of
some national governments. As often happens in
exploring the genealogy of ideas, ancestors are
identified who would not be entirely welcome at
the hearths of their progeny alive today.
Bask needs
The starting point is the world depression of the
1930s añd the contemporaneous dissemination of
nutritional discoveries. Following appearance of
a seminal report to the Health Organisation of
the League (Burnet & Aykroyd 1935) there was
inaugurated at Geneva an international food
movement (Black 1943), the purpose of which
was to raise nutritional levels in order to engin-
eer recovery in agricultural export markets.
The principal broker for this marriage of health
and agriculture was the Australian politician S.
M. (later Lord) Bruce; his advisers were the
economist F. L. McDougall and the nutritionist
and social reformer John Boyd Orr. Through
these men and the reports engendered by their
campaign (League of Nations 1935, 1937a; ILO
1936) the line of descent is clear to the postwar
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN
(McDougall 1943; Hambidge 1955).
The notion of scientifically establishing require-
ments of health and human development to show
the inadequacy of current consumption levels was
quickly extended from food to other universal
human wants, such as for housing, clothing,
schooling and medical care. Again the Australian
delegation led by Bruce took the initiative at
Geneva, proposing enquiry into "measures of a
national or inter-national character for raising the
standard of living". On the basis of subsequent
reports and memoranda (McDougall 1937, 1938:
ILO 1938; League of Nations 1938) the terrain
and objectives of the nutrition campaign begun
in 1935 were much extended. Its core was still
nutritionbecause food appeared the first
necessary of life, or food requirements were those
that could be most exactly specified, or food
markets those that the campaigners wanted most
to expand. But norms of hygiene and norms
dependent on public approbation were being
formulated alongside those of nutrition; living
standards in general instead of food consumption
in particular were being measured and compared;
and in place of a policy of producing economic
recovery through better feeding and freer trade
in the agricultural staples there were suggestions
that consumption as a whole should be manipu-
lated so as to control fluctuations in world
economic activity and perhaps also (with an eye
particularly to Japanese exporting) to relieve
international political tensions.
To raise sub-standard levels of consumption, in-
come had to be redistributed in cash or kind in
favour of the poor. For example, the Mixed
Committee of the League attached much value
to free school milk and meals (League of
Nations 1937a: 42-43). This was the kernel of
a far larger issue. If schooling itself had been
socialised in many countries, why should not also
feeding, the need for which was yet more funda-
mental and more precisely definable by science?
Ought not food supply to become another public
service or utility, distributed in accordance with
physiological needs and charged at nominal prices,
as had already happened, it was believed (Burnet
& Aykroyd 1935: 459), in Soviet Russia? And
since the nutritional needs of a human being had
as much validity in, say, rural China as in
Glasgow, ought not this detachment of food
from the market to be worldwide rather than
confined in national boundaries? A world popula-
tion nourished in accordance with the laws of
physiology, the supplies of food to meet this
criterion bought and distributed publicly, was
both a nutritional ideal and the ultimate means
of absorbing agricultural capacity. Just such a
prescription were Boyd Orr's Proposals for a World
Food Board (FAO 1946; Boyd Orr 1966), the
apotheosis of the international food movement,
submitted to the second FAO conference in 1946.
Obviously, even more radical implications
followed from adding to food other "objective
elements in the standard of living" to define the
scientifically established birthrights of all men.
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These implications attracted many who were
untouched by the socialist ethnic. In the right
degree and places, socialism was perceived good
for business. With economic capacity under-
employed and confidence in economic
mechanisms lost, Geneva in the 1930s provided
common ground for both scientists and trade
unionists moved by collectivist ideals and inclina-
tions, and diplomatists moved by pressure to find
larger and more secure markets and better
remuneration for producers of foodstuffs and
manufactures. This harmony of aspirations
required an understanding of how socialist
measures were to be financed. Most potent and
appealing of the possibilities canvassed was the
notion that they would pay for themselves, that
raising the effective demand of the poor need
carry no opportunity costs in a world of
'potential plenty'. Plenty was held to be
potential not so much in underemployed capacity,
as some critics may have supposed (Clark 1940;
3-4; Hayek 1944: 73) as in incomplete realisation
of the productive powers of science (see, e.g.,
Burnet & Aykroyd 1935: 368-70)though this
scarcely strengthened the basis of the doctrine.
Between this living-standards movement of the
1930s and the now fashionable 'basic-needs
approach' to development (UN 1972, 1973; ILO
1976; Jolly 1976; Lisk 1977) are obvious parallels,
if that is not too mild a term, and it is presumably
no accident that the campaign has been revived
while the world has been experiencing its worst
economic recession since the 1930s. The new, or
supposedly new, approach has involved a retreat
from treating increase in the estimate of GNP
per capita as the sovereign aim of development.
How did the campaigners of the l930s avoid
that conceptualisation of their purpose? Briefly,
they did not accept the 'national equation'
(Röpke 1935) without whose intercession the
statistic of GNP per capita is meaningless as an
indicator of individual welfare. Socialists they
were all in more or less degree; but not National
Socialists.
World development programmes
Ominous interpretations of the depression were
offered in the later 1930s. Keynes's vision of the
arteriosclerotic economy became analytically
elaborated in his General Theory (1936), while
in the USA explanations of 'secular stagna-
tion' were argued nost notably by Alvin Hansen
(1938, 1941). By the time of the war, the notion
that the more mature economies had reached a
stage in which deficiency of investment demand
was endemic was almost as familiar as the idea
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that they were subject to epidemic instability.
World development programmes, or plans for
international capital flows for the industrialisa-
tion of 'undeveloped areas' of the world, were
proposed in the early l940s mainly as a new
frontier for investors, though the possibility was
also discussed of using them as a counter-cyclical
device. Much the fullest study of these plans is
the ILO report on World Economic Develop-
ment (1944), written by Eugene Staley, though
there are many earlier contributions (Staley 1939,
1941, 1942; Durbin 1942; Condliffe 1943; Bryce
1943; Rosenstein-Rodan 1944) and the primacy
was sometimes acknowledged of Sun Yat-Sen
who, a generation earlier, had offered China as
"the 'Economic Ocean' capable of absorbing all
the surplus capital as quickly as the Industrial
Nations can possibly produce" (1943: 6).
A striking indication of the contemporary under-
standing of world development programmes is
Staley's method of estimating their order of
magnitude. He did not work backward from
target rates of growth in per capita income to
aid requirements, as was later to become the
practice, by making assumptions about capital
coefficients, domestic savings and population
growth. Instead he estimated the absorptive
capacity for capital of the undeveloped areas on
the basis of Japanese performance since 1900.
The purpose was not to show the magnitude of
the sacrifice the mature economies would have
to make to develop the undeveloped areas but
the scale on which they might be disembarrassed
of redundant savings. It appeared the amount
was not so great as to make unnecessary domestic
measures to overcome an excessive saving
propensity. Moreover, only a generation or two
of grace would be obtained by world develop-
ment; the return flow of interest and capital repay-
ments would eventually exceed the outflow,
aggravating the problem of maintaining full
employment unless rejuvenation had been
accomplished by domestic policies in the
meantime (ILO 1944: ch IV).
This argument assumed that the capital would
flow on commercial terms. Indeed, there was
much confidence that capital at the margin would
be more productive in undeveloped areas than in
countries already rich in assets (Bryce 1943: 364;
ILO 1944: 112). The failure of experience
generally to bear out this expectation, coupled
with the failure of either secular stagnation or a
cyclical slump to recur after 1945, extinguished
any economic case for world development pro-
grammes. It is therefore ironical that such pro-
grammes were launched and became part of the
economic scenery of the postwar world. The
explanation is that they served foreign policies.
From the beginning there had been ambivalence
about the terms on which capital should be trans-
ferred. It seemed out of keeping with the
humanitarian spirit of a new world order that
the poor should be charged market rates for the
superfluity of the rich (Durbin 1942; Boyd Orr
1942: 58, 78). It might even seem dangerous not
to give freely and so avert the disaffection of the
poor (Rosenstein-Rodan 1944). Recognition that
international capital transfers on concessional
terms or with non-commercial motives would be
made to serve national interestsas had
happened already in the US Export-Import Bank
(Whittesley 1939; Patterson l943)was avoided
by supposing that the programmes would be
entrusted to supra-national authorities (Meade
1940; Corbett 1942; Condliffe 1943). In retrospect
it seems an extraordinary failing that the political
character of the postwar world, with its multi-
plication of sovereign entities, was so much
mistaken. But they were heady days, when it
was possible for a future President of Italy to
write that the only sure outcome of the war was
the disappearance of the anachronistic sovereign
state (Einaudi 1940).
Have-not nations
Not only in the years following the second world
war but also in those immediately preceding it
disparities between 'have' and 'have-not'
nations were widely believed to be critical for
peace and security throughout the world (RIJA
1936, 1938). Membership of the two categories
was not the same in the two periods. Nor was the
definition of what was possessed or lacked. In the
1 930s there were only three have-notsGermany,
Italy and Japanand what they lacked was not
the difference between their own and other
nations' income per head but raw materials
purchasable in their own currencies, and colonies
from which such materials might be obtained.
The prewar state of national want nevertheless
presaged the postwar. It implied a foreign
exchange gap between the means and ends of the
afflicted government. It denoted an economy
unbalanced in its structure and unable to satisfy
rising expectations. It identified a state
disadvantaged and handicapped as compared
with others, relatively deprived, victim of past
political settlements; expressing vociferously its
dissatisfaction with the international economic
order and the laws, conventions and distribution
of power supporting that order; and demanding
concessions in its favour by states better off than
itself.
Like the have-nots of the 1930s, those of the
postwar world perceived their difficulties to lie in
the inadequacy of the range of resources at
national disposal. The old have-nots, as
industrialised countries, were conscious of their
lack of raw materials. The new have-nots, most
of which exported raw materials, perceived their
want of manufacturing industry. Without raw
materials, the old have-nots could not employ
their people productively, raise living standards,
establish true national independence and take
their rightful places in the world community.
Without manufacturing, the new have-nots were
similarly impeded.
Buying the products of the missing resources
from other countries was no solution. It produced
damaging relationships of dependence on foreign
powers; it precluded economic autonomy with-
out which political independence was but a
facade. Moreover, the means of buying foreign
products were deemed to be hardly won. For the
have-nots of the l930s the special difficulties of
earning foreign exchange were held to result
from restrictions in international trade and pay-
ments (League of Nations 1937b, 1946; Robbins
1939). For the later generation other explanations
were devised. Their exports had abnormally
unstable prices, or prices subject to secular
deterioration in relation to prices of the imports
received in return, or earnings that must lag
behind income growth in the markets they
supnlied or that were inveterately depressed
relatively to import costs by 'unequal exchange'
or by technological disparities. So the new have-
flots wanted not the products of manufacturing
but the capacity to make the products, just as
the old had wanted mines and plantations rather
than the industrial materials they produced.
Another parallel is that just as in the 1930s there
were industrialised countries without colonies
that did not experience the difficulties of
Germany, Italy and Japan in obtaining sufficient
raw materials because they followed different
economic policies (RuA 1936: II, 31-32; Ohlin
1936: 142), so in the postwar period there were
also underdeveloped countries that looked out-
ward rather than inward (Myint 1967) and did
not suffer the constraints characteristic of their
class in securing international purchasing power.
The pre-war conception of national deprivation
is all but forgotten, obliterated by sudden recogni-
tion of who the 'real have-nots' were (PEP
1942: 7). Recalling this unremembered forbear
suggests that have-not status might be some-
thing chosen or sought by governments rather
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than thrust upon them by circumstance, and
that the numerous brood of have-nots that
appeared after the war ifiled a category of
diplomacy rather than, as was generally supposed,
social science (Rimmer 1979).
Absolutism
This brief survey has barely hinted at the most
persistent and powerful strain in development
economics. It is the strain implanted by Euro-
pean governments of the 1930s that mobilised
economic resources for national ends. Thus to
orchestrate a 'national economy' was regarded
at the time as appropriate to preparation for war
rather than to the raising of welfare. But there
was an easy passage to the belief that the total-
itarian methods were usable for benevolent
purposes (Balogh 1942: 57), including the
development of underdeveloped countries. Indeed,
by about 1950 it was evidence of eccentricity to
suggest that such development was possible
except by concerted social effort, governmental
will-power to impose collective sacrifices, bureau-
cratic coordination of economic life, deliberate
manipulation of popular emotions, and assertion
of national autonomy (UN 1951). So the
physiognomy of the European dictatorships
reappeared in the state machineries of Asia and
Africa. The new nations suffered the inevitable
consequences of accepting a single overriding
purpose. Their governments became parochial
in their conceptions, jealous of their rights, sure
of their responsibilities and absolutist in their
ideologies.
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